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Religious Perspectives of College Teaching in Anthropology

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Dorothy D. Lee

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PREFACE TO THE SERIES OF ESSAYS

Three years ago Professor George F. Thomas of Princeton University, in a letter to The Edward W. Hazen Foundation, urged the need for careful studies by natural scientists, social scientists, and humanistic scholars concerning the religious issues, implications and responsibilities involved in the teaching of their respective disciplines. This pamphlet is part of a series instituted by The Edward W. Hazen Foundation for the purpose of carrying Professor Thomas' suggestion into the sphere of fruitful inquiry and discussion. Under the sponsorship of The Foundation, the undersigned committee has enlisted the aid of distinguished scholars deeply interested in the relations between religion and higher education. Each of these scholars will discuss the problem in its specific pertinence to his own field of learning, his own conception of his intellectual and spiritual responsibilities to his students, to the institution which he serves, and to society in general. He will address himself primarily to fellow-teachers in his field, secondarily to students and to interested members of the educated public.

The committee responsible for the survey wishes to steer a course between two opposite dangers; that of a theological vagueness which would produce nothing but noncommittal generalities, and that of a dogmatism which would alienate all but a small number of readers. The views of the authors of these essays may vary from liberal to orthodox interpretations of religion. Throughout this diversity, however, runs a common denominator which is shared by the authors and by the members of the committee. Religion is not nature-worship, or man-worship, or science-worship. It is not the totality of human value. Although it is metaphysical, ethical, and humanitarian, it cannot be equated with metaphysics, or ethics, or humanitarianism. Religion is man's quest for communion with an ultimate spiritual reality completely independent of human desires and imaginings. Religion apprehends this Absolute Reality and Value in faith, and seeks to give concrete embodiment to the ineffable in creed, cult, and conduct. The creative power of the universe is not an intellectual abstraction but an objective entity, a Divine Being. Although God infinitely transcends our human nature and understanding, He most potently reveals Himself to those who conceive of Him in personal terms. Thus symbolized, He becomes

for us not merely Cosmic Mind, but Creator, Judge and Redeemer of mankind.

Within this broad but positive consensus the authors of these essays will exercise complete freedom in expressing their personal views. As regards the relevance of religion for higher education there is also general agreement among those associated with this survey. The cleavage which divides intellectual from spiritual life is probably the most ominous defect of modern civilization. "High religion and intellectual enterprise belong together," says Professor Robert L. Calhoun. "Each gains from close association with the other. The two in conjunction, but neither one by itself, can move with hope toward more effective conquest of the chaos that again and again threatens to engulf human living. That way lies whatever chance we may have for a more humane world."

In his essay *Colleges, Faculties and Religion,* appraising consultations with more than fifty faculties, Professor Albert C. Outler reports that "Education is by way of being reformed with little or no regard for the possible contribution of religion to its reformation. For a very tangled skein of reasons, it has come to pass that, in the name of tolerance and the democratic spirit, American educators (whatever their private beliefs and convictions) have in fact suppressed the consideration of the problems of the religious interpretation of reality and human existence in the educational process." He sees, however, evidence that religion will become increasingly influential in American higher education if it can receive "a fair hearing in the open forum of American academic discussion . . . . Where this is done, there is usually a vigorous and generally favorable reaction from both faculty and students."

To obtain such a "fair hearing" from a large academic audience is the purpose of these essays. Even in these days of "general education," however, the modern scholar remains a specialist. He is likely to be less interested in the general problem of the place of religion in higher education than in the specific problem of how religion pertains to the teaching of his particular subject. This more specialized aspect of the question deserves more careful investigation than it has hitherto received. At present, therefore, these essays are being published as separate pamphlets so that each may appeal directly to those concerned with the discipline which it discusses.

It is hoped, however, that the project may prove fruitful enough to justify later publication in a single volume or perhaps in three shorter books devoted respectively to the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities.

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PRINTED IN U.S.A.

RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES IN ANTHROPOLOGY

Dorothy D. Lee

This essay is concerned with the most widely taught branch of Anthropology, that which deals with culture. Culture has been described recently by Clyde Kluckhohn as "a way of thinking, feeling, believing."[1] The late Edward Sapir regarded it as defining "for every society, the world in which it lives."[2] In both these statements, we find the implication that religion is of the very fabric of culture. To teach about culture as a totality, then, as a unit with inner consistency and integrity, anthropologists must include religion in their teaching as a matter of course.

I

In the pages below, we shall speak of various conceptions of man's relatedness to human and non-human nature, to reality and circumstance, and of his view of his own place within the universe. Since his universe includes the divine, or is itself divine, his worldview is pervaded by religion. We shall speak about deities, but more often, we shall speak of the religious dimension of experience and behavior, since these permeate all living. It is this religious dimension of experience which should be included by the teacher in the description of the different areas of culture; when he speaks of agricultural practices, or about health measures, or about hunting, or what we call art. To include religion in the teaching of anthropology, it is not necessary to teach a course in Primitive Religion; and to my mind, it is misleading to isolate religion in a separate course, since it occurs usually as an ingredient of daily life.

We do not always find deities in primitive cultures, or not always deities who have reference to the daily living of men. We do find societies where a Supreme Being is recognized; but this Being is frequently so far removed from mundane affairs, that it is not present in the consciousness of the people, except on the specific occasions of ceremonial or prayer. But in these same societies, we find communion with the unperceivable and unknowable in nature, with an ultimate reality, whether spirit, or power, or intensified

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[1] Clyde Kluckhohn, *Mirror for Man* (New York, 1949) p. 23.

[2] David G. Mandelbaum, *ed., Selected Writings of Edward Sapir* (Berkeley, 1949) p. 347.

being, or personal worth, which evokes humility, respect, courtesy or sometmes fear, on man's part. This relationship to the ultimate reality is so pervasive, that it may determine, for example, which hand a man will use in adjusting his loin cloth, or how much water he will drink at a time, or which way his head will point when he sleeps, or how he will butcher and utilize the carcass of a caribou.

Material culture, therefore, should be taught with full recognition of the religious aspect of the operations involved. The background of the activity, man's relationship to his own work and to that upon which he is operating, is usually permeated with religion. All economic activities, such as hunting, gathering fuel, cultivating the land, storing food, assume a relatedness to the encompassing universe, and with many cultures, this is a religious relationship. In such cultures, men recognize a certain spiritual worth and dignity in the universe. They do not set out to control, or master, or exploit. Their ceremonials are periods of intensified communion, even social affairs, in a broad sense, if the term may be extended to include the forces of the universe. They are not placating or bribing or even thanking; they are rather a formal period of concentrated, enjoyable association. In their relationships with nature, the people may see themselves as the offspring of a cherishing mother, or the guests of a generous hostess, or as members of a democratic society which proceeds on the principle of consent. So, when the Baiga in India were urged to change over to the use of an iron plow, they replied with horror that they could not tear the flesh of their mother. And American Indians have hunted many animals with the consent of the particularized essence of these animals, after establishing a relationship of reciprocity, with man furnishing the ceremonial, and Buffalo or Salmon or Caribou making a gift of his flesh. The great care with which so many of the Indian groups utilized every portion of the carcass of a hunted animal, was an expression, not of economic thrift, but of courtesy and respect; in fact, an aspect of the religious relationship to the slain. The Wintu Indians of California, who lived on land so wooded that it was difficult to find clear land for putting up a group of houses, nevertheless used only dead wood for fuel, out of respect for nature. An old Wintu woman, speaking in prophetic vein, said the following: "The White people never cared for land or deer or

bear. When we Indians kill meat, we eat it all up. When we dig roots we make little holes. When we build houses, we make little holes. When we burn grass for grasshoppers, we don't ruin things. We shake down acorns and pinenuts. We don't chop down the trees. We only use dead wood. But the White people plow up the ground, pull up the trees, kill everything. The tree says, 'Don't. I am sore. Don't hurt me.' But they chop it down and cut it up. The spirit of the land hates them. They blast out trees and stir it up to its depths. They saw up the trees. That hurts them. The Indians never hurt anything, but the White people destroy all. They blast rocks and scatter them on the ground. The rock says 'Don't! You are hurting me.' But the White people pay no attention. When the Indians use rocks, they take little round ones for their cooking . . . How can the spirit of the earth like the White man? . . . Everywhere the White man has touched it, it is sore."[3]

The anthropologist then has to deal with people who do not so much *seek* communion with environing nature, as *find themselves in* communion with it. So when he teaches even a subject as apparently mundane as economics, he cannot fail to include religion, unless he makes an artificial exclusion. In many of the cultures to which he refers, or which he describes, or from which he takes illustrative material, not even mysticism is to be found, in our sense of the word. For us, mysticism presupposes a prior separation of man from nature; and communion is achieved through loss of self and subsequent merging with that which is beyond; but for many other cultures, there is no such distinct separation between self and other, which must be overcome. Here, man is *in* nature already, and we cannot speak properly of man *and* nature. Take the Kaingang, for example, who chops out a wild bee hive. He explains his act to the bees, as he would to a person whom he considered his coordinate. "Bee, produce! I chopped you out to make beer of you! Yukui's wife died, and I am making beer of you so that I can cut his hair." Or he may go up to a hive and say simply, "Bee, it is I."[4] And the Arapesh of New Guinea, going to his yam garden, will first introduce to the spirit of the land, the brother-in-law whom he has brought along to help him with the gardening.

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[3] Cora Dubois, *Wintu Ethnography* (Berkeley, 1935) p. 75.
[4] Jules Henry, *Jungle People* (Richmond, 1941) p. 87.

This is not achieved communication, brought about for definite ends. It implies an already present relatedness with the ultimate reality, with that which is accepted in faith, and which exists irrespective of man's cognition or perception or logic. If the teacher were to abstract, out of this situation, merely the food getting or the operational techniques, he would be misrepresenting the reality.

The same present relatedness is to be found in some societies where the deity is more specifically defined. The Tikopia, in the Solomon Islands Protectorate, sit and eat their meals with their dead under the floor, and hand food and drink to them; the dead are all somewhat divine, progressively so as they come nearer to the original, fully divine ancestor of the clan. Whatever their degree of divinity, the Tikopia is at home with them; he is aware of their vague presence, though he requires the services of a medium whenever he wants to make this presence definite. Firth describes an occasion when a chief, having instructed a medium to invite his dead nephew to come and chew betel with him, found himself occupied with something else when the dead arrived, and so asked the medium to tell the spirit—a minor deity—to chew betel by himself. At another time, during an important ceremonial, when this chief was receiving on his forehead the vertical stripe which was the symbol that he was now the incarnation of the highest god, he jokingly jerked his head aside, so that the stripe, the insignium of the presence of the god, went crooked. These are the acts of a man who feels accepted by his gods, and is at one with them. And, in fact, the Tikopia appear to live in a continuum which includes nature and the divine without defining bounds; where communion is present, not achieved; where merging is a matter of being, not of becoming.

In these cultures, where religion is an everpresent dimension of experience, it is doubtful that religion as such is given a name; Kluckhohn reports that the Navaho have no such word, but most ethnographers never thought to inquire. Many of these cultures, however, recognized and named the spiritual ingredient or attribute, the special quality of the wonderful, the very, the beyondness, in nature. This was sometimes considered personal, sometimes not. We have from the American Indians terms such as *manitou,* or *wakan,* or *yapaitu,* often translated as power; and we have the well-known Melanesian term *mana.* But this is what they reach

through faith, the other end of the relationship; the relationship itself is unnamed. Apparently, to behave and think religiously, is to behave and think. Certainly the teacher of culture finds that to describe a way of life in its totality is to describe a religious way of life.

II

In past years, when anthropology was predominantly atomistic, the ethnographer analysed activity, or even one act alone, into its secular and religious components, and presented one group of elements under the heading of agriculture or manufacture, and the other in a separate section of the book, under the heading of magic or ritual or religion. It was natural, then, that technology should be taught as completely secular "material culture," that courses in "social organization" or "primitive society" should include only positivistically defined structure, and religion should be taught only as a separate course in the curriculum, containing along with the discussion of cosmology and the pantheon, those taboos and ritual acts which were included in the daily activity of the people in the various societies covered.

This compartmentalization was often completely foreign to the culture under consideration. For example, when preparing seed for planting, one of the several things a Navaho does is to mix ground "mirage stone" with the seed. And in the process of storing corn, a double-eared stalk is laid at the bottom of the storage pit. In actual life, these acts are a continuous part of a total activity; should they be divorced from this in presentation, and presented discretely? The distinction between the religious and the secular elements may even separate an act from the manner of performance, a verb from its adverb. The direction in which a man is facing when performing a secular act, or the number of times he shakes his hand when spattering water, often have their religious implications. When the Navaho planted his corn sunwise, his act reflected a total worldview, and it would be nonsense to separate the planting itself from the direction of the planting, in presentation. Yet such separations have often been made by students who had been trained to see religion as a thing apart, or at best as something additive.

Those anthropologists who present religion as separate from "everyday" living, reflect moreover the distinctions of a culture

which will identify six days with the secular in life and only the seventh with religion. In many primitive societies, religion is rarely absent from the details of everyday living, and the ceremonials represent a formalization and intensification of an everpresent attitude. We have societies such as that of the Hopi of Arizona, where ceremonials, and the preparation for them, cover most of the year. Some years ago, Crow-wing, a Hopi, kept a journal for the period of a year, putting down all events of interest or importance. By far the largest number of the entries contain some casual reference to a religious activity; sometimes the sole subject is a ritual, or the preparation for a ceremonial. After a few weeks of such entries, we come to a sequence of four days' entries which are devoted to a description of a ball game played by two opposing groups of children and enjoyed by a large number of spectators. But, in the end, this also turns out to have been ceremonial in nature, helping the corn to grow. Crow-wing was a layman, reporting those events of interest to the layman; but, like every Hopi, he was not completely secular, since he had a responsible role in maintaining the universal order; and this was a role which he filled every day, all the time; not one assumed on special days or special occasions.

III

Today, some anthropologists continue to deal with culture atomistically, considering that only through prior analysis and, at most, subsequent artifically created synthesis, can a scientific approach be maintained. Other anthropologists speak of the basic configuration of culture, the patterning of activities, the totality of beliefs and attitudes, the design for living. But even these often present the totality analytically, separating each act from its context, voiding it of its meaning. Faced with the need to present their material clearly, and in a form which is readily comprehensible to young members of our own culture, they choose to analyse, to isolate, to arrange and organize in ways which make sense to their hearers, instead of presenting the material situationally, as they find it. Observed acts taken out of the confusion of meaningful reality, can be presented "objectively," they can be measured and counted. Quantification endows the material with a semblance of the scientific, but it often violates the reality. When a subsequent synthesis is made, there is danger that the teacher will read his own interpre-

tation, his own motivations, ends and values, his own meaning, into the practices which he has described. To avoid this danger, the teacher would have to study each culture in its completeness, its whole system of attitudes, of values, of concepts, its social structure, from which the individual practice derives meaning. But it is arduous and time-consuming to do this, when all one wants is an example to illustrate the cultivation of yams.

The choice seems to lie between covering a wide range of illustrative material, and presenting only a few instances in their totality. The teacher who believes that there is integrity or totality or design in culture, who believes in interrelatedness of traits, will have to choose the latter course if he is to act on his belief. He will make no arbitrary separations and exclusions; and, as a consequence, he will present his cultural facts with their religious dimension.

In teaching about the economic life of the present day Maya, for example, such a teacher will be speaking of religion when he describes the cultivation of corn. As Robert Redfield and W. Lloyd Warner write:

> "The agriculture of the Maya Indians of southeastern Yucatan is not simply a way of securing food. It is also a way of worshipping the gods. Before a man plants, he builds an altar in the field and prays there. He must not speak boisterously in the cornfield; it is a sort of temple. The cornfield is planted as an incident in a perpetual sacred contract between supernatural beings and men. By this agreement, the supernaturals yield part of what is theirs—the riches of the natural environment—to men. In exchange, men are pious and perform the traditional ceremonies in which offerings are made to the supernaturals . . . The world is seen as inhabited by the supernaturals; each has his appropriate place in the woods, the sky, or the wells from which the water is drawn. The village is seen as a reflection of the quadrilateral pattern of the cosmos; the cornfield too is oriented, laid out east, west, north, and south, with reference to the supernaturals that watch over the cardinal points; and the table altars erected for the ceremonies again remind the individual of this pattern. The stories that are told at the time when men wait to perform the ceremony before the planting of the corn or that children hear as they grow up are largely stories which explain and further sanction the traditional way of life."[5]

[5] 1940 Yearbook of Agriculture, *Farmers in a Changing World* (Washington) pp. 989-990.

When the teacher sets out to present Navaho art, he has to explain first the Navaho concept of harmony between man and the universe as basic to health and well being; the concept of continuity, the religious significance of the groups of four, the door of contact opened through the fifth repetition, the need to have no completely enclosing frame around any of their works so that continuity can be maintained and the evil inside can have an opening through which to leave. When he speaks of the so-called sandpaintings the teacher will be speaking of religion; because these are no more art than they are ritual, myth, medical practice or religious belief. They are created as an integral aspect of a ceremonial which brings into harmony with the universal order one who finds himself in discord with it; or which intensifies and ensures the continuation of a harmony which is already present. Every line and shape and color, every interrelationship of form, is the visible manifestation of myth, ritual and religious belief. The making of the painting is accompanied with a series of sacred songs sung over a sick person, or over someone who, though healed of sickness by emergency measures has yet to be brought back into gear with the universal harmony; or in enhancing and giving emphasis to the present harmony. What we would call purely medical practices may or may not be part of all this. When the ceremonial is over, the painting is over too; it is destroyed; it has fulfilled its function.

This is true also of the art of the neighboring Hopi, where the outstanding form of art is the drama. In this we find wonderfully humorous clowning, involving careful planning and preparation, erection of magnificent masks and costumes, rehearsals, organization. Everyone comes to see and responds with uproarious hilarity. But this is not mere art. It is an important way of helping nature in her work of growing the corn. Even the laughter of the audience helps in this. More than dramatic rehearsal and creation of costumes has gone into the preparation. The actors have prepared themselves as whole persons. They have refrained from sexual activity, and from anything involving conflict. They have had good thoughts only. They have refrained from anger, worry and grief. Their preparation as well as their performance have had a religious dimension. Their drama is one act in the great process of the cyclical growing of corn, a divinity indispensible to man's well

being, and to whose well being man is indispensible. Corn wants to grow, but cannot do so without the cooperation of the rest of nature and of man's acts and thoughts and will. And, to be happy, corn must be danced by man and participate in his ceremonials. To leave the religious dimension out of all this, and to speak of Hopi drama as merely a form of art, would be to present a fallacious picture. Art and agriculture and religion are part of the same totality for the Hopi.

If the teacher, in describing the Hopi, takes the economic life as his starting point, he is again bound to include the religious aspect, if he is to give a true picture. In our own culture, an activity is considered to be economic when it deals with effective utilization or exploitation of resources. But this definition cannot be used when Hopi economics is taught. To begin with, it assumes an aggressive attitude toward the environment. It describes the situation of the homesteader in Alaska, for example, who works against tremendous odds clearing land for a dairy farm, against the inexorable pressure of time, against hostile elements. By his sweat, and through ingenuity and education and the use of brutally effective tools, he tames nature; he subjugates the land and exploits its resources to the utmost. The Hopi, however, working on the land, does not see himself in opposition to it. He works *with* the elements, not *against* them. He helps the corn to grow; he cooperates with the thunderstorm and the pollen and the sun. He is in harmony with the elements, not in conflict; and he does not set out to conquer an opponent. He depends on the corn, but this is part of a mutual interdependence; it is not exploitation. The corn depends on him too. It cannot grow without his help; it finds life dull and lonely without his company and his ceremonials. So it gives its body for his food gladly, and enjoys living with him in his granary. The Hopi has a personal relationship with it. He treats it with respect, and houses it with the care and courtesy accorded to an honored guest. Is this economics?

In a work on Hopi economics we are given an account of the Hopi Salt Journey, under the heading, "Secondary Economic Activities." This expedition is aso described in a Hopi autobiography, and here we discover that only those men who have achieved a certain degree of experience in the Hopi way, can go on this journey; and then, only if their minds are pure and they are in a

state of harmony with the universe. There is a period of religious preparation, followed by the long and perilous journey which is attended by a number of rituals along the way. Old men, lowering themselves from the overhanging ledge onto the salt deposits, tremble with fear, knowing that they may be unable to make the ascent. The occasion is solemnly religious. This is no utilization of resources here, in the eyes of the Hopi. He goes to help the growing corn; the Salt Journey brings needed rain. Twelve adult men will spend days and court dangers to procure salt which they can buy for two dollars from an itinerant peddler. By the standards of the students' culture this is not an efficient use of human resources. But when the teacher presents the situation in all its aspects, including the religious aspect, the students see that the Hopi has achieved his ends with efficiency.

Matters which the student has been taught to regard as purely economic are often couched in religious terms; and it is the task of the teacher to guide the student in understanding them as they occur in different cultures. Land tenure, or the transference of land, operations involved in hunting and agriculture, are often a part of a religious way of life. In our own culture, man conceives of his relationship to his physical environment, and even sometimes his human environment, as mechanistic and manipulative; but the student must be taught not to assume that this attitude is present in other cultures. Any presentation in the field of economics, must take into account the religious conception of nature, what Ruth Benedict has called the animistic attitude toward nature and man. Here the teacher finds a place for practices which are often classified miscellaneously together in ethnographies, under the heading of superstitions or taboos. The courteous speech to the bear about to be killed, the offering to the deer world before the hunter sets out, the introduction of the brother-in-law to the garden spirit, or the sacrifice to the rice field about to be sold, the refraining from intercourse, or from the eating of meat or from touching food with the hand, are some of these. They are the practices we find in a democratic society, which considers the right of others, as opposed to the brutal efficiency of the dictator. They reflect the attitude of people who believe in conference and consent, not in coercion; of people who generally find personality or mana in nature and man, sometimes more,

sometimes less. In this framework, taboo and superstitious act mean that man acts and refrains from acting in the name of a wider democracy which includes nature and the divine.

With such a conception of man's place in nature, what is for us land tenure, or ownership, or rights of use and disposal, is for other societies an intimate belongingness. So the Arapesh conceive of themselves as belonging to the land, in the way that flora and fauna belong to it. They cultivate the land by the grace of the immanent spirits, but they cannot dispose of it and cannot conceive of doing so. This feeling of affinity between society and land is widespread and appears in various forms and varying degrees of intensity, and it is not found only among sedentary peoples. We have Australian tribes where the very spirit of the men is believed to reside in the land, where a bush or a rock or a peculiar formation is the present incarnation of myth, and means security and religious value; where a social class, a structured group of relatives, will contain in addition to human beings, an animal and a feature of the landscape. Here, when a man moves away from the land of his group, he leaves the vital part of himself behind. When a magistrate put people from such societies in jail in a distant city, he had no idea of the terrifying severity of the punishment he was meting; he was cutting the tribesman off from the very source of his life and of his personality, from the past, and the future which were incorporated and present in his land.

In presenting the technology of such societies, the teacher again is dealing with material where the religious and secular are not distinct from each other. We have, for example, the description which Raymond Firth gives of the replacing of a worn out wash strake on a canoe, among the Tikopia. This operation is expertly and coherently carried out, with secular and religious acts performed in continuous succession or even concurrently. A tree is cut down for the new wash strake, a libation is poured out to the deities of the canoe to announce this new timber, and a kava rite is performed to persuade the deities to step out of the canoe and on to a piece of bark cloth, where they can live undisturbed, while the canoe is being tampered with. Then comes the unlashing of the old wash strake, the expert examination of the body of the canoe in search of lurking defects, the discovery of signs indicating the work of a borer, the cutting of the body of the canoe with a swift stroke

to discover whether the borer is there, accompanied by an appeal to the deities of the canoe by the expert, to witness what he is doing, and the necessity for doing it. Now a kinsman of the original builder of the canoe who is one of the tutelary deities, spontaneously drops his head on to the side of the canoe and wails over the wounding of the body of the canoe. The borer is discovered, in the meantime, to be still there; but only a specially consecrated adze can deal with him successfully. The adze is sent for, dedicated anew to the deity, invoked, and finally wielded with success by the expert. All this is performed with remarkable expedition and economy of motion. So, even when the teacher is discussing such supposedly purely economic matters such as time-saving procedures and efficiency of operation, he will be speaking of religion; because the Tikopia are not concerned with time-limits, with speed; but in this case, their concern for the dispossessed deities whose home must be made ready for their return, makes for speed and time-saving procedures. The end result is efficiency; but unlike our own efficiency, this is not rooted in the effort to utilize and exploit material and time resources to the utmost; it is rooted in that profound religious feeling which also gives rise to the time-consuming rites and the wailing procedures which, from the purely economic point of view, are wasteful and interfering.

IV

Courses dealing with systems of thought in primitive cultures, as a rule, cannot but include religion. The world view of a particular society includes that society's conception of man's own relation to the universe, human and non-human, organic and inorganic, secular and divine, to use our own dualisms. It expresses his view of his own role in the maintenance of life, and even of the forces of nature. His attitude toward responsibility and initiative is inextricable from his conception of nature as deity-controlled, man-controlled, regulated through a balanced cooperation between god and man, or perhaps maintained through some eternal homeostasis, independent of man and perhaps of any deity. The way a man acts, his feeling of guilt and of achievement, and his very personality, are affected by the way he envisions his place within the universe. In presenting a world view, the teacher has only to point out and emphasize the religious element which is so much a

part of the picture as to be in danger of being taken for granted and overlooked.

If the teacher, for example, takes up conceptions of man's effectiveness in the universe, he has to discuss them in terms of the religious system, beliefs and attitudes of each society under consideration. For example, there are the Tiv of Southern Nigeria who people the universe with potentially hostile and harmful deities and powers, the *akombo.* Man's function in the maintenance of his own life and the well-being of the land and of his social unit, is to defeat the evil intent of the *akombo,* to render safe through preventive rites, to purify through rites of expulsion and purging. His own role is preventive, negative, saving the normal course from interference. Vis-a-vis the universe, his acts arise out of negative motives. For example, what corresponds to a gift of first-fruits to a deity in other cultures, is phrased as a rite for preventing the deities from making a man's food go bad or diminish too quickly; fertility rites for a field are actually rites preventing the evil-intentioned from robbing the fields of their normal fertility.

The way the Ifugao and neighboring tribes in Luzon conceive of their own effectiveness, patterns their activities in every field; and here, again, the teacher will be dealing mainly of religion when he speaks of man's effectiveness. These people either accept what comes as deity-given, or act without being themselves the agents; they believe that no act can come to a conclusive end without the agency of a specific deity. The Ifugao have a specific deity often for every step within an operation and for every part of the implement to be used. R. F. Barton recorded the names of 1240 deities and believed that even so he had not exhausted the list. The Ifugao associate a deity with every structured performance and at least a large number of their deliberate acts. They cannot go hunting, for example, without enlisting the aid of the deity of each step of the chase, to render each effective, or to nullify any lurking dangers. There is a deity for the level spot where "the hunter stands watching and listening to the dogs"; one for when the dogs "are sicced on the game," one for when "the hunter leans on his spear transfixing the quarry"; twelve are listed as the deities of specific ways of rendering harmless to the hunter's feet the snags and fangs of snakes which he encounters. If he is to be successful in the hunt, a man does not ask the blessing of a deity. He pays all the par-

ticular deities of every specific spot and act, getting them to transitivize each act individually. Even so, in most cases a man remains non-agentive, since the function of many of the deities is to save man from encounter, rather than to give him success in his dealing with it. For example, in the area of interpersonal relations, we have Tupya who is invoked so that, "the creditor comes for dun for what is owed, but on the way he forgets and goes about other business"; and Dulaiya, who is invoked so that, "the enemies just don't think about us, so they don't attack." His tools, also, are ineffective of themselves; so that, when setting a deadfall, he invokes and bribes such deities as that for the Flat Stone of the Deadfall, the Main Posts of the Deadfall, the Fall of the Deadfall, the Trigger of the Deadfall. Most of the Ifugao economy is involved in providing sacrifices to the deities, big or little according to the magnitude of the operation and the importance of the deities. There is no warmth in the sacrifices; no expression of gratitude or appeal or belongingness. As the Ifugaos see it, the sacrifice is a bribe. With such bribes, they buy the miraculous intervention and transitivization which are essential for achievement, health, and good personal relations.

The Ifugao show no humility in the face of this ineffective role in the universe; they merely accept it as the state of things. They accept their own failures, the frequent deaths, the sudden and disastrous flaring up of tempers, as things that are bound to happen irrespective of their own desires and efforts. But they are neither passive nor helpless. They carry on great undertakings, and, even now they go on forbidden head-hunts. They know when and how and whom to bribe so as to perfect their defective acts. When however, a deity states a decision, they accept it as immutable. A Catholic priest tells a story about the neighboring Iloko which illustrates this acceptance. A Christian Iloko was on his deathbed, and the priest, trying to persuade him to repent of his sin, painted to him vividly the horrors of hell; but the dying man merely answered, "If God wants me to go to hell, I am perfectly willing."

In making a study of the conception of man's own effectiveness among the Wintu Indians of California, through an analysis of linguistic categories, the present writer found that a study of the religion was necessary for adequate understanding. The students, analyzing the cosmological myths of the tribe, discovered that man

had a limited agentive role, shaping, using, intervening, but never creating. They found that man needed skill for his operations, but that specific skill was useless without "luck" which a man received through communion and pleading with some universal power. This circumscribed agentive role was found to be implicit in the linguistic categories also. The language was found to have a verbal category for referring to subjective experience, to the area where man is an agent, where he perceives, feels, knows, thinks, desires, intends. A derivative stem refers to this area, and a large number of suffixes are used with this stem, documenting the experience in great detail, giving specific source of information, state of the perceived, etc. Another category, using the primary form of the stem, refers to that reality which is irrespective of man and the agency of man; here, concepts such as that of futurity, potentiality, necessity, probability, and succession, are covered by one suffix. And in this category, the only personal suffixes are those expressing unalterable promise and those implying the possibility of interception or avoidance. So even within the area where man has no agency, he can at least intercept or avoid the inevitable. He does not wait for divine intervention only.

It is to this limited role of man, geared to the working of the universe, that the teacher was referring when he spoke of Hopi drama and agriculture. Without an understanding of this role, no Hopi activity or attitude or relationship can be understood. The Hopi have developed the idea of man's limited effectiveness in their own fashion, and have elaborated systematically in what they call the "Hopi Way," Laura Thompson says of the Hopi,

> "All phenomena relevant to the life of the tribe—including man, the animals, and plants, the earth, sun, moon, clouds, the ancestors, and the spirits—are believed to be interdependent through one Law which may be thought of as a 'Law of Universal Reciprocity' . . . In this system each individual—human and non-human—is believed to have its proper place in relation to all the other phenomena, and each has a definite role in the universal order. The scheme does not operate immutably, however, on account of the special role played by man. Whereas the non-human world is controlled automatically by the rhythmic reciprocity principle, man is a responsible agent who may or may not completely fulfill his function in it . . . To the traditional Hopi, the movements of the sun, the coming of rain, the growth of crops, the reproduction of animals and of human

beings depend (to a certain extent at least) on man's correct and active participation in the fulfillment of the natural Law . . . The universe is not conceived as a sort of machine at the mercy of mechanical law. Nor is it viewed as a sum total of hostile, competitive forces struggling for existence. It is by nature a harmonious integrated system operating rhythmically according to the principles of immanent justice, and in it the key role is played by man's will . . . The Hopi believes that each individual is a responsible social agent through the creative development of his will, and hence Hopi interest in the whole man centers in the development of the will through both mind and body . . . Man has definite responsibilities which should be carried out according to a rather complicated set of rules. These rules embody cosmic Law reduced to the level of human thought, feeling, and behavior. They form an informal and unwritten ethical canon known as the Hopi Way."[6]

The Hopi Way is mainly religious in nature, and is expressed in its greatest intensity in the ceremonial cycle throughout the year.

The Indians of the Plains, such as the Crow and the Sioux, have given a somewhat different form to this conception of man's circumscribed agency. The aggressive behavior for which they have been known, their great independence, their self-assurance and assertiveness and in later years, their great dependence and apathy, have been explained as an expression of this conception. These societies envisioned the universe as pervaded by an undifferentiated religious force on which they were dependent for success in their undertakings and in life generally. The specific formulation differs in the different tribes, but, essentially, in all it was believed that each individual, and particularly each man, must tap this universal force if his undertakings were to be successful. Without this "power" a man could not achieve success in any of the valued activities, whether warfare or the hunt; and no leadership was possible without this power. This was a force enhancing and intensifying the being of the man who acted; it was not, as with the Ifugao, an effectiveness applied to specific details of activities. The individual himself prepared himself in the hardihood, self-control, skills and areas of knowledge necessary. Little boys of five or seven took pride in their ability to withstand pain, physical hardship, and the terrors of running errands alone in the night. The Sioux did not

[6] Laura Thompson, *"The Hopi Crisis"* (Mimeo.) pp. 42-45.

appeal for divine intervention; he did not want the enemy to forget to come. Neither was he fearless. He appealed for divine strength to overcome his own fears as well as the external enemy.

The relationship with the divine, in this case, is personal and intense. The Plain Indian Sioux did not, like the Hopi, inherit a specific relatedness when he was born in a specific clan. Each man, each pre-adolescent boy, had to achieve the relationship for himself. He had to go out into the wilderness and spend days and nights without food or drink, in the cold, among wild beasts, afraid and hungry and anxious, humbling himself and supplicating, sometimes inflicting excruciating pain upon himself, until some particular manifestation of the universal force took pity upon him and came to him to become his life-long guardian and power. The appeals to the universal force were made sometimes in a group, through the institution of the Sun Dance. But here also they were individual in nature. The relationship with the divine was an inner experience; and when the Sioux Black Elk recounted his autobiography, he spoke mainly of these intense, personal religious experiences. The Hopi Crow Wing made very frequent reference to religion, also, in his journal; but his reference was not to individual experience, but to group activity; the first personal singular *I* is of very rare occurrence in the journal.

V

At present, many courses are taught on the application of anthropological knowledge to present-day world problems, such as the problems and issues involved in the introduction of technological change in many areas of the world. We know that, in attempting to introduce measures which make for improvement in living, workers have discovered that a knowledge of the religion of the particular group is imperative. Without this, the attempted changes are often ineffective, and, worse than this, they run the danger of disrupting or destroying the values of the people, that which gives meaning to their lives. It is essential that the students in these courses do not learn merely effective techniques for inducing change; they must be impressed with the need to understand, respect, and take into account the religion of the people in question.

Attempts to introduce change in areas such as agriculture, health, nutrition, land-ownership, have come up against profound religious

attitudes. Workers could not persuade Mexican farmers to save their best seed for planting, since these people believed that God alone—not the quality of the seed—was responsible for a good yield, so long as man performed his share of the work well. In the Middle East, workers found that villagers were not prepared even to recognize that they had ill-health, or polluted or foul-tasting water, since they considered these to represent the workings of God's will, and God's will could not be anything but good. The workers found villagers worrying over the success of a DDT campaign, because the mosquitoes and other bugs had been God-given, and God might now decide to give worse afflictions in their place. Yet Mohammedan workers in this region were able to introduce changes both effectively and reassuringly, since they worked in harmony with the people's religion. In this way, also, Ibn Saud introduced mechanization and agricultural measures without disturbing the faith of his people.

The teaching of religion must be included in courses on this subject; without it, courses may teach the unreflective student to be merely manipulative. And if culture is to be understood in all its aspects, the teaching of religion must form a part of all courses dealing with culture.

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